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ABSTRACT: This essay examines the Foucauldian foundations of queer theory in the work 
of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick.  The essay argues that Sedgwick’s increasing disappointment 
with Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis is in part produced by the slippery 
rhetoric of The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction.  Specifically, Foucault’s use of free 
indirect discourse in that volume destabilizes both the theory of repression and the critique 
Foucault mounts against it, thereby rendering ambiguous any political promise his critique 
might seem to offer.  Returning to the fraught relation between Foucault and Sedgwick, the 
essay concludes by reading Foucault and Sedgwick together through the lens of a repa-
rative ethics in which the felt experience of knowing the world is also an experiment in new 
ways of living. 
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In my personal life, from the moment of my sexual  
awakening, I felt excluded, not so much rejected,  
but belonging to society’s shadow.  It’s especially 
 striking as a problem when you discover it for yourself.1  
 
In this rare, unpublished remark from 1975, Foucault describes his own sexual experience 
of exclusion, marginalization, and queer self-discovery growing up in France in the 1940s 
and 50s.  Given Foucault’s well-known doubts about a repressive hypothesis that conceives 
of modern sexuality as an inner secret to be hidden or revealed, this archival coming-out 
story is surprising.  Indeed, it appears to contradict what Judith Butler and many other mo-
dern theorists of sexuality inspired by Foucault have consistently asserted, that Foucault 
“always resisted the confessional moment.”2  But here in an interview conducted precisely 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, “Entretien avec Roger-Pol Droit,” 9 cassettes, Institut Mémoires de l'Edition Contem-
poraine (IMEC), (June 1975), 29, translation mine.  The French original reads: “Je me suis senti, dès l'éveil 
de ma sexualité, exclu non pas tellement rejeté que appartenant à la part d'ombre de la société, et que 
finalement c'est tout de même un problème qui est impressionant quand on le découvre pour soi-même.”  
2 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 110.  In 
her later book, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), Butler argues 
that Foucault modified his view of confession in his later work on the ancient world.  But as Dave Tell 
explains (“Rhetoric and Power: An Inquiry into Foucault's Critique of Confession,” Philosophy and Rhe-




at the time Foucault was writing what would become his influential critique of the Freudian 
theory of repression, his revelation of a “moment” of “sexual awakening” appears to repeat 
the dualistic logic of secrecy and exposure he challenged in History of Sexuality, Volume 
One.3 
Or does it? To be sure, Foucault’s declaration of his “sexual awakening” looks, at 
first glance, like the paradigmatic closet structure—from darkness to light, from ignorance 
to knowledge—that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick famously identified in Epistemology of the Closet 
(1990) as “inexhaustibly productive of modern Western culture and history at large.”4  But a 
closer look at Foucault’s remark suggests there is another, nondualistic logic at work here.  
Plotted against the modern epistemology of the closet analyzed by Sedgwick, where 
“knowledge means in the first place sexual knowledge” and “ignorance, sexual igno-
rance,”5 Foucault’s sexual self-exposure doesn’t quite match the standard truth-telling 
structure by which queers are typically enjoined to come out.  Indeed, if Foucault stages a 
certain kind of coming out here, its scenic backdrop is not an Enlightenment landscape 
where darkness gives way to light.  Rather, Foucault’s “sexual awakening” leaves him in a 
more ambiguous, penumbral space, as one who belongs to “society’s shadow.”  
I will resist the temptation to decipher this statement in a biographical mode, where 
its shadowy imagery might be illuminated by referring to France in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury as a homophobic place and time not conducive to queer coming out, a place and time 
that continued to consign abnormals to “society’s shadow.”  Such a socio-historical reading 
risks being complicit with psychiatric power by turning Foucault into a modern deviant 
“whose slow formation is shown in a biographical investigation.”6  Such a reading also 
risks glossing over important questions about the relation between philosophy and rheto-
ric, questions that are relevant to Foucault’s position as a founding thinker of queer theory. 
Rather than adopting the lens of psychobiography, I want to read Foucault’s shadow 
figure as a way to name his problematization7 of the dark/light dualism that structures 
Western thinking.  That problematization not only nuances what at first appears to be a see-
mingly straightforward, if rare, coming out confession by Foucault.  It also complicates our 
                                                                                                                                                             
toric vol. 43, no. 2 (2010)), Foucault returns to confession in the Greeks and Romans in order to distin-
guish the ancient techniques of the self from Christian confession.  Tell argues that those Greek techni-
ques are “nonrhetorical.” (96)  Although this may be correct in a strictly historical sense—that is, Greek 
techniques do not depend on modern rhetorical modes—Tell's privileging of the nonrhetorical here cor-
responds with his attempt to classify Foucault as a “positivist” whose only desire is to gain immediate, 
empirical (nonrhetorical) access to reality's “surfaces.”  This understanding of rhetoric distorts Foucault's 
own description of his work as problematization: that is, “the ensemble of discursive and non-discursive 
practices that make something into the play of true and false and constitute it as an object of thought.” 
(Michel Foucault, “Le Souci de vérité” [1984], in Dits et écrits 2 (Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001), 1487) 
(translation and emphasis mine).  The constitutive forces of that discursive and non-discursive ensemble 
must be, by definition, both rhetorical and nonrhetorical. 
3 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage, 1990), 10. Hereafter cited as HS1.  
4 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 68. 
5 Ibid., 73. 
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1977), 252. 
7 See footnote 2 for an explanation of this term. 
Foucault Studies, No. 14, pp. 20-40. 
22 
 
sometimes too easy, dualistic assumption that Foucault simply says no to the repressive 
hypothesis.8  Following Sedgwick in her later work, I engage Foucault’s shadow play as a 
way “to explore promising tools and techniques for nondualistic thought and pedagogy”9: 
the gray, in-between space of agency’s middle ranges.  I use Foucault to trace the how of 
that nondualism, still recognizing, with Sedgwick, the dark/light paradox of negation: that 
“even to invoke nondualism...  is to tumble right into the dualistic trap.”10  In Foucault, the 
how of nondualism involves a contestation of the subject-object, transcendental-empirical 
doublet that defines the modern analytic of finitude.11  Foucault’s autobiographical remark 
brings our attention to “society’s shadow” not as an object to be known by a subject who 
stands outside it but as a cognitive, affective, and ethical experience that blurs the boun-
daries of subject and object. 
“I felt excluded,” Foucault says, “not so much rejected, but belonging to society’s 
shadow.”12  Importantly, Foucault’s challenge to Western dualism is not achieved through a 
propositional logic.  Rather, Foucault’s readers receive that challenge as a felt experience of 
knowing.  And as I will demonstrate later in this essay, this felt experience is a disorienting 
one that Foucault achieves through the use of free indirect discourse.  How does it feel to 
know Foucault’s contestation of Western thinking?  A technical exposition of his use of the 
novelistic technique of free indirect discourse offers a way to explore the how of that feeling 
and knowing.   
Thinking with Sedgwick, I want to give this rhetorical approach to Foucault another 
name, in a non-pejorative sense: “touchy-feely.”13  In Touching Feeling, Sedgwick names a 
shift in her own work: away from paranoid exposure toward a reparative position that “in-
augurates ethical possibility,” away from questions of knowing toward “new questions 
about phenomenology and affect.”14  In aligning Foucault with a touchy-feely Sedgwick, I 
do not want to erase the differences between them.  The journey I trace here toward a queer 
rapprochement that outlives them both is also a dialogue about a difficult love.  As a drama 
about queer theory’s foundations in Sedgwick and, specifically, her focus on Foucault’s 
critique of the repressive hypothesis, that dialogue includes all the elements of the classic 
love plot: the initial, electrifying coup de foudre (Sedgwick falls in love with Foucault’s cri-
                                                 
8 Such readings of Foucault are pervasive.  In the field of queer theory, Robert J. Corber and Stephen Val-
occhi’s “Introduction” to Queer Studies: An Interdisciplinary Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) is typical, 
where Foucault’s notion of productive power is presented as “contrary to what Foucault called ‘the re-
pressive hypothesis’,” 10 (emphasis added).  My point is not that such readings are incorrect, but that the 
no-yes logic of replacement they assume elides some of the rhetorical nuances of Foucault’s thinking. 
9 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003), 1.  Hereafter cited as TF. 
10 Ibid., 2. 
11 For Foucault's explication of this argument see especially Chapter Nine, “Man and his Doubles,” in The 
Order of Things (New York: Vintage, 1994), 303-343. 
12 Foucault, “Entretien,” 29, emphasis added. 
13 Sedgwick, TF, 17. 
14 Ibid., 137, 17.  In Chapter Four of Touching Feeling, “Paranoid Readings, Reparative Readings,” Sedg-
wick draws on Melanie Klein’s concept of the depressive position (as opposed to the paranoid position) 
to explore the possibility of reparative critical practices that would offer an alternative to the “infinitely 
doable and teachable protocols of unveiling [that] have become the common currency” (143) of contem-
porary critical work.  




tique of the repressive hypothesis), the disappointment that ensues as the coup de foudre 
fizzles (Sedgwick is increasingly disappointed by the critique’s unrealized promise), and 
love’s dénouement in a final renunciation (Sedgwick finally gives up on Foucault and re-
pression to focus on other questions).  Over the course of that drama, and even after the 
curtain falls, Foucault and Sedgwick talk back to each other.  We keep hearing their voices 
because the issues that concern them resist resolution.  Nowhere is this more true than in 
the felt aspects of their work.  Sedgwick’s “touchy-feely” thought and pedagogy repudiates 
epistemology in favor of “a particular intimacy...  between textures and emotions.”15  Fou-
cault, by contrast, devoted his life to an affectively charged archival thinking about the rela-
tion between subjectivity and truth; his focus on truth-telling suggests a refusal to simply 
dismiss epistemological questions.  So too contra Sedgwick’s assertion in her later work 
that “touching and feeling are irreducibly phenomenological,”16 Foucault would insist that 
her phenomenological claim (in support of her move away from epistemology) both as-
sumes and denies her own engagement in the epistemic “games of truth” that make such 
claim-making possible at all.  To resolve these differences between Foucault and Sedgwick 
by subsuming the touchy-feely into a greater knowing would flatten the nuance that dif-
ferentiates the two thinkers. 
Rather than sublating Foucault and Sedgwick into a happy resolution, I want to read 
their fraught relation as a story that outlives them, in a dedialectizing rhetorical mode that 
will link Foucault’s use of free indirect discourse to a desubjectivating, reparative ethics 
made possible by Sedgwick.  In Part One, “Sedgwick’s Disappointment,” I track one strand 
of that story through Sedgwick’s engagement with Foucault, exploring in particular the 
possible reasons for the fizzling of her initial coup de foudre.  Noting Sedgwick’s increasing 
frustration with a Foucault whose thinking had been axiomatic for her, I suggest that her 
almost exclusive focus on Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis to the exclusion 
of other aspects of his work inevitably results in the disappointment she articulates in her 
later writings.17  I focus specifically on how Sexuality One’s ironic rhetorical structure pro-
duces a blind spot that keeps Sedgwick fixated on the no-yes logic of repression and libe-
ration even as power in Foucault becomes increasingly governed by biopower’s gradational 
logic of continuity.18  
In Part Two, “A Slippery Obsession,” I offer a more detailed explanation of the rea-
sons for Sexuality One’s failure to deliver on the promise it held out for Sedgwick.  I focus in 
this section on the shadowy rhetoric called free indirect discourse that frames Foucault’s 
critique of the repressive hypothesis.  Foucault exploits the ironic force of free indirect dis-
                                                 
15 Ibid., 17. 
16 Ibid., 21. 
17 Although the narrative I trace from initial enthusiasm to later disappointment is broadly accurate, there 
are nuances to be noted in this story.  As Sedgwick herself notes, some of her earlier writings hold the 
seeds of her later critique of Foucault.  See for example her 1992 essay, “Gender Criticsm” in Redrawing 
the Boundaries: The Transformation of English and American Literary Studies, edited by Stephen Greenblatt 
and Giles Gunn (New York: MLA, 1992), 271-302, where Sedgwick faults Foucault for overemphasizing 
the proliferation of perversions at the expense of a blindness to the persistent homo/heterosexual division 
that structures Western thinking in the 20th century. 
18 On biopower’s logic of gradation see especially Mary Beth Mader, Sleights of Reason: Norm, Bisexuality, 
Development (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011), 46. 
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course’s “dual voice,”19 thereby destabilizing both the theory of repression and that theory’s 
(ironically) repressive critique.  In so doing, Foucault mounts an almost Sedgwickian chal-
lenge to dualism: the text’s ironic rhetorical force destabilizes the mind-body split that de-
fines the Cartesian thinking subject.  Foucault’s anti-dualism thus aligns him with Sedg-
wick but also marks a moment when he departs from her.  As mentioned earlier, Foucault 
highlights epistemological questions, whereas Sedgwick separates questions of knowing 
from those involved in the “tactile plus emotional” realm of the “touchy-feely.”20  Foucault 
might respond that his archivally based contestation of the Western ratio exposes the cost of 
the Cartesian split by producing in his readers an affective and corporeal experience of kno-
wing.   
All well and good, Sedgwick might say.  But this exposure of the cost of Cartesian du-
alism is itself dualistic because it participates in a paranoid critical project whose logic is 
ultimately repressive.  And so the debate might continue.  In Part Three, “Ridiculous Love,” 
I show how the nay-saying antagonisms underlying such a debate collapse into a Foucaul-
dian reparative strand made visible by Sedgwick’s Kleinian thinking.  I argue in this final 
section that Foucault’s paranoid ironies exhibit other-than-paranoid dimensions.  Adopting 
Sedgwick’s reparative terms, I suggest that Foucault articulates a practical ethics in which 
the felt experience of knowing the world is also an experiment in new ways of living.  Love 
is the word Sedgwick offers for this queer experiment about being with others: “like a big/ 
allegory about love./Experimental.”21  I have argued elsewhere that Foucault’s work might 
be read, similarly, through the lens of love: that Foucault offers us the traces of an ethics of 
eros.22  But that ancient word, eros, exposes the strangeness and difficulty of such experi-
mentation.  Reading Foucault and Sedgwick together, as “a big allegory about love,” might 
offer another way to pursue such a difficult, “sweetbitter” ethics.  As Sappho inimitably 
puts it in Fragment 71: 
 
Eros once again limb-loosener whirls me sweetbitter, impossible to fight off, creature 
stealing up.23 
 
Perhaps together Foucault and Sedgwick can teach us to practice a desubjectivating erotic 
ethics that might whirl us, sweetbitter (and still a little paranoid), into reparative ways of 
thinking, feeling, and acting in the world.   
 
1. Sedgwick’s Disappointment  
While Sedgwick’s earlier engagement with epistemology raises questions about Western bi-
narisms, her challenge to dualistic thinking becomes more salient in her later work even as 
she brackets epistemological questions.  I focus here on how she articulates her critique of 
dualism around the problem of repression and Foucault’s famous critique of the repressive 
                                                 
19 Monika Fludernik, “The Illusion of Linguistic Alterity: The Free Indirect as Paradigm of Discourse Re-
presentation,” Diacritics vol. 25, no. 4 (1995), 105. 
20 Sedgwick, TF, 17. 
21 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, A Dialogue on Love (Boston: Beacon, 1999), 155. 
22 See Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), especially Chapter Five. 
23 In Anne Carson, Eros the Bittersweet (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 3. 




hypothesis in Sexuality One.  In Shame and Its Sisters (1995), Touching Feeling (2003), and The 
Weather in Proust (2011), Sedgwick mounts a repeated challenge to the relentless binarism 
that clings to “repression and the critical analysis of repression.”24  Her critique of analytic 
repressive binarisms conveys an increasing sense of disappointment with Foucault and his 
“implicit promise”25 to get us out from under repression’s thumb.  Where Sedgwick 
thought she might find in Foucault “a point of departure for nondualistic ways of thin-
king”26 and a “project of thinking otherwise,”27 she finds instead a rhetorical game that 
keeps us stuck.  Sedgwick writes: 
 
The triumphally charismatic rhetorical force of Volume One suggests that Foucault con-
vinced himself—certainly he has convinced many readers—that that analysis itself re-
presented an exemplary instance of working outside of the repressive hypothesis.  Rather 
than working outside of it, however, Volume One, like much of Foucault’s earlier work, 
might better be described as propagating the repressive hypothesis ever more broadly by 
means of displacement, multiplication, and hypostatization.28 
 
Even more pointedly, in The Weather in Proust, Sedgwick argues that Sexuality One is “justly 
famous” but “ultimately circular”:29 
 
Foucault demonstrates a devastating performative continuity between the diagnostics of 
these projects, the way they analyze the central problematic of Western culture (repres-
sion), on the one hand, and on the other hand their therapeutics, the ways in which they 
propose to rectify it.  For if there is some problem with the repressive hypothesis itself, if 
in important ways repression is a misleading or even damaging way to understand the 
conditions of societies and individuals, then the main performative effect of these centu-
ries-long anti-repressive projects may be the way they function as near-irresistible propa-
ganda for the repressive hypothesis itself.30 
 
Sedgwick’s claims about the self-propagating logic of both repression and the critique of re-
pression are astute and important.  As she points out in Touching Feeling, Foucault is ulti-
mately “more struck by the proliferation of modern discourses of sexuality than by their 
suppression,”31 and this insight demonstrates his sense “that there may really be no ‘rup-
ture’ between ‘repression and the critical analysis of repression.’”32  However, Sedgwick’s 
difficulty in separating Foucault from the queer Foucauldianism that draws on his work ul-
timately leads to a partial and misleading characterization of Foucault in the story she tells 
about the persistence of critical work structured by the repressive hypothesis.   
                                                 
24 Sedgwick, TF, 10.  See also Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan 
Tomkins Reader (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Weather in 
Proust, edited by Jonathan Goldberg (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 
25 Sedgwick, TF, 12. 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Ibid., 11. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Sedgwick, Weather, 133. 
30 Ibid., 133. 
31 Sedgwick, TF, 10. 
32 Ibid., 10.  Sedgwick cites Foucault, HS1, 10. 
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Sedgwick’s increasing disappointment with Foucault stems, in my view, from an 
overreading of repression in Sexuality One.  Unlike Butler and many other queer theorists, 
Sedgwick is not a Freudo-Foucauldian.33  But she does, like many first-generation queer 
theorists, limit her use of Foucault primarily to his critique of the repressive hypothesis, to 
the exclusion of other aspects of his thinking.  In particular, Sedgwick’s overreading of re-
pression in Sexuality One leads her to ignore biopower, the continuous, nonindividualizing 
but decidedly nonreparative mode of power Foucault highlights in the final section of the 
volume. 
As Mary Beth Mader explains, in Foucault’s view one of the key features of modern 
biopower is “the production of a kind of continuity” where “a gradational ontology re-
places one of opposition.”34  If repression is based on an oppositional logic—repressed or 
liberated, no or yes—biopower is based on a scalar logic of gradation.  As statistical, medi-
calized, measuring devices that order life at every scale—from population control to genetic 
engineering—the instruments of biopower are “not deployed in a field of opposition, but in a 
field of gradation from the normal to the abnormal.”35  Framed within biopower, the “idea of 
sex,”36 Foucault writes, actually “makes it possible to evade what gives ‘power’ its power; it 
enables one to conceive power solely as law and taboo.”37  As queer theory’s aegis-creating 
analytic focus, this “idea of sex” thus threatens to mask the nonindividualizing, gradational 
ontology that characterizes  biopower. 
There are both conceptual and rhetorical explanations for Sedgwick’s Foucauldian 
blind spot regarding the evasion of biopower’s nonindividualizing continuities.  Specifical-
ly, Sedgwick’s repeated focus on repression to the exclusion of biopower produces a con-
ception of Foucault’s rhetorical strategies as “triumphally charismatic”38 and ultimately 
complicit with repressive “propaganda.”39  Her conceptual oversight stems, in part, from a 
rhetorical underreading: Sedgwick seems not to hear or feel the volume’s most pervasive 
rhetorical mode, that of irony—the rhetoric of self-division par excellence—despite her own 
insight that the book may be “divided against itself”:40 divided, we might say in conceptual 
terms, between a logic of opposition and a logic of gradation.41  
Foucault’s irony not only destabilizes his truth claims about repression’s oppo-
sitional logic, but also distracts its readers into focusing on repression and its overcoming, 
even as the volume sounds the alarm about a biopower that extends rather than negates the 
logic of repression.  And indeed, Sedgwick never directly addresses the shift Foucault tra-
                                                 
33 For a book-length analysis of queer Freudo-Foucauldianism see Huffer. 
34 Mader, 46. 
35 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, translated by Graham Burchell 
(New York: Picador, 2003), 42. (Emphasis added). 
36 Foucault, HS1, 155. 
37 Ibid., 155. (Emphasis added). 
38 Sedgwick, TF, 11. 
39 Sedgwick, Weather, 133. 
40 Ibid., 10. 
41 This self-divided logic appears in various ways throughout Sexuality One; the most obvious appears in 
Part Five, where Foucault describes disciplinary power and regulatory biopower as “the two poles 
around which the organization over life was deployed.” (139) As Mader explains, the disciplinary/ 
regulatory distinction at work here highlights the shift from law to norm in the logic of modern biopower 
(Mader, 50). 




ces in Part Five of Sexuality One from disciplinary to biopower.  But importantly for Sedg-
wick, that shift is a mutation from the dualistic, no-yes logic of the repressive hypothesis to 
the nondualistic but hardly beneficent yes-saying power of biopolitics.  Sedgwick’s swerve 
away from biopower makes it difficult to reconcile her sense of Foucault’s “triumphally 
charismatic” rhetoric with Sexuality One’s dénouement in the genocidal politics of the Final 
Solution and a multi-scalar ordering of existence by “managers of life and survival.”42 
Although ultimately my aim is to think Foucault with Sedgwick, here my reading of 
Foucault obviously departs from hers.  In explaining the reasons for my disagreement with 
a scholar whose capacity to think rhetorically and philosophically has long inspired my 
own interpretive methods, I want to show how Sexuality One’s ironic structure and tone 
underscores its concluding biopolitical theme even as we, its readers, continue to fall into 
the crack of Victorian repression and its critique.  As a rhetorical mode that expresses self-
division, irony is the great deceiver whose force derives from its capacity to appear 
simultaneously as what it is and what it is not.  As I will show in Part Two, Foucault’s ironic 
assertions in Sexuality One appear to reproduce a non-ironic, no-yes dualism consistent with 
the logic of repression even as irony’s self-fracturing destabilization of meaning undoes the 
very dualism on which yes-or-no certitudes depend.  This helps to explain the dizzying 
afterlife of Sexuality One, where Foucault’s ironic rhetorical force has left all of us both 
bedazzled and confused, both poised for liberation and disappointed by the volume’s bro-
ken promises.  To be sure, a few readers have hinted at Foucault’s irony, remarking on the 
double-voiced “ventriloquism” of Sexuality One.43  But many read it, in the end, as offering 
some ethical guidance in the form of an ought: “The rallying point for the counterattack 
against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.”44 
But two pages later that guidance is complicated by another, slightly different 
“ought.”  Foucault writes that our entire sexual dispositif—”these devices,” which I take to 
include not only sex-desire, but also bodies and pleasures—”ought to make us wonder to-
day.”45  This second “ought” doesn’t cancel out the earlier call for bodies and pleasures as a 
counterattack against sex-desire, but it complicates that call considerably by invoking a 
form of thinking or wondering that would make our own present strange.  Foucault in-
vokes that strangeness when he writes that one day “people will no longer quite under-
stand”46 what we now accept, unthinkingly, as the epistemic foundations of the age of sex.  
But as the volume’s winking last sentence suggests, even this more complex, thinkerly 
“ought”—these directions to imagine a future thinking that would allow us to queer our 
sexual present—threatens to repeat the dualistic, no-yes logic of repression and liberation: 
                                                 
42 Foucault, HS1, 137. 
43 On Foucault's ventriloquism see especially Andrew Parker, “Foucault's Tongues,” Mediations vol. 18, 
no. 2 (1994), 80-88. 
44 Foucault, HS1, 157. (Emphasis added).  A comprehensive overview of queer theory’s deployment of 
“bodies and pleasures” in Sexuality One is beyond the scope of this essay.  For a classic example of bodies 
and pleasures as the site of queer freedom see David Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).  For a useful overview and more nuanced view, see Ladelle 
McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1999).   
45 Foucault, HS1, 159. (Emphasis added). 
46 Ibid. 
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“The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our ‘liberation’ is in the ba-
lance.”47  Even the different thinking Foucault repeatedly advocates runs the risk of self-
projection into a future freedom through an act of negation that repudiates the present: 
saying no to a now in which we perceive ourselves to be unfree, we say yes to our own 
desire for (a future) freedom and thereby repeat the structure of sex-desire.  Such “I”-driven 
projections certainly have inspired us to act politically and to fight for LGBT rights of va-
rious kinds.  But as Sedgwick points out, those projections are also inexorably bound to re-
pressive thinking.  And as Foucault insists again and again, freedom cannot be a transcen-
dental ideal: it can only be a difficult, uncertain, desubjectivating practice in the present.48  
With this background in mind, the reservations I’ve articulated about Sedgwick’s 
critique of Foucault should not be construed as in any way dismissing the overwhelmingly 
helpful “thinking other than dualistically”49 project she develops in Touching Feeling and 
throughout her work.  Rather, I want to linger over Foucault and Sexuality One in order to 
amplify and extend Sedgwick’s insights into the paradoxes of queer Foucauldianism.  As 
Sedgwick infers, we all repeatedly stumble into the repressive trap Foucault so dramatically 
brought to our attention.  Indeed, it is virtually impossible not to do so.  But contra Sedg-
wick, I argue that Sexuality One’s rhetoric is ironic rather than triumphally charismatic.  
And further, if we have all been ambushed by that rhetoric, this is hardly a sign that Fou-
cault had convinced himself, against all evidence, that he alone could step “outside” the 
repressive hypothesis.  As I demonstrate in detail in Part Two, Foucault’s use of irony al-
lows him to take a different tack as he navigates his way through the age of sex.  Irony’s 
tropological grammar of self-division fissures meaning from within.  Through free indirect 
discourse, Foucault’s self-splitting utterances destabilize repressive dualism through a de-
dialectizing movement of aporetic irresolution and fracture.   
If Sedgwick’s critique of Foucault is contestable, her critique of queer Foucaul-
dianism hits its mark.  One of Touching Feeling’s powerful correctives to queer Foucauldia-
nism is Sedgwick’s concise but accurate taxonomy of the many ways contemporary theories 
have been ensnared by Foucault: how they have failed to bypass the repressive hypothesis 
even as they’ve claimed to do so.  Her five-part listing reads like the conceptual greatest 
hits of Foucault-inspired theory over the past thirty years; it includes productive, interna-
lized, proliferating, discursive, and falsely naturalizing conceptions of power.  According to 
Sedgwick, what these theories obstinately share, despite their sophistication and variance 
from one another, is their common belief that “even beyond the repressive hypothesis, 
some version of prohibition is still the most important thing to understand.”50  In the face of 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 For an excellent analysis of freedom as a practice see Johanna Oksala, Foucault on Freedom (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
49 Sedgwick, TF, 1. 
50 Ibid., 11.  To be sure, Sedgwick’s list is vulnerable to the charge of reductivism.  But her condensation of 
fifteen years of queer theory into a pithy list of critical habits that also characterize her own earlier work is 
both rhetorically powerful and conceptually freeing; such poetic concision allows her to elaborate new 
modes of thinking that depart from the same queer conceptual foundations she herself helped to estab-
lish.  My purpose here is neither to prove nor disprove, on evidentiary grounds, the validity of Sedg-
wick’s claim about all of queer theory.  No doubt there are exceptions and the list could be nuanced in 




that stubborn critical worry about prohibition above all else, Sedgwick rightly concludes 
that Foucault’s “analysis of the pseudodichotomy between repression and liberation has 
led, in many cases, to its conceptual reimposition in the even more abstractly reified form of 
the hegemonic and the subversive.”51  This “Gramscian-Foucauldian contagion” turns 
“‘hegemonic’ into another name for the status quo (i.e., everything that is)”52 and “sub-
versive” into everything that is not.  Thus antinormative, antihegemonic theorists of every 
stripe have ended up performing “the same ‘negative relation’ that had, in Foucault’s ar-
gument, defined the repressive hypothesis in the first place.”53  The result is what Sedgwick 
calls “a moralistic tautology” whose “seeming ethical urgency” disguises its “gradual eva-
cuation of substance.”54 
Sedgwick’s arguments in Touching Feeling highlight her frustrations with a queer 
theoretical field she was largely responsible for founding.  Importantly, her increasing dis-
satisfaction, over the course of the 1990s, with the binary “moralisms of the repressive hy-
pothesis”55 led her to explore alternative sources for understanding that strange, inchoate, 
“artificial unity”56 called sexuality: away from Oedipal Freudianism toward Melanie Klein, 
away from discursive language toward the tactile immediacy of the textile arts, away from 
Western epistemologies toward Buddhist practices.  But these departures were always ac-
companied by what she called “stubborn” returns to her “obsessions”57: J. L. Austin’s How 
to Do Things With Words, Silvan Tomkins’s Affect Imagery Consciousness, Judith Butler’s Gen-
der Trouble, and Michel Foucault’s Sexuality One.   
Sedgwick’s early work is marked by a welcoming disposition toward her Foucault 
obsession; as she puts it in Epistemology of the Closet, the book was written “in accord with 
Foucault’s demonstration, whose results I will take to be axiomatic.”58  Over a decade later, 
in Touching Feeling, she is still a “goodish Foucauldian subject”59 but admits to major mis-
givings about his work.  In the posthumously published The Weather in Proust, those mis-
givings have morphed into a more decisive repudiation of Foucault.  Comparing him un-
favorably to writer-activists such as Guy Hocquenghem, Sedgwick surprisingly finds Fou-
cault to be an “inapt choice” as “a French exemplar for American queer theory.”60  And 
regarding Foucault’s value for new ways of thinking, Sedgwick asserts even more dismis-
sively that “the invigorating perspectives” of thinkers like Silvan Tomkins “make Foucault 
look particularly marmoreal.”61  Why such a definitive condemnation?  Did Sedgwick find 
herself caught in the repressive hypothesis trap as well?  Does her repudiation of Foucault 
                                                                                                                                                             
various ways.  But Sedgwick’s general claim about a critical investment in a repressive structure seems 
valid enough on conceptual grounds; as she herself goes on to demonstrate. 
51 Ibid., 12. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 12-13. 
54 Ibid., 12. 
55 Ibid., 64. 
56 Foucault, HS1, 154. 
57 Sedgwick, TF, 2. 
58 Sedgwick, Epistemology, 3. 
59 Sedgwick, TF, 13. 
60 Sedgwick, Weather, 182n8. 
61 Ibid., 182n8. 
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and his paranoid exposures signal her sense that there is no way out except by rejecting 
Foucault altogether?  Perhaps part of her frustration is the result of a self-recognition: an 
awareness that such nay-saying departures cannot help but repeat the relentless logic of 
repression.  (Is this why she tucked those dismissals of Foucault into a footnote: into the 
shadow cast by the body of her text?)  
And yet, even in her disappointment Sedgwick keeps returning to Sexuality One, a 
volume whose force in her life she describes as obsessive.  Again, this almost exclusive fo-
cus on Sexuality One—an exclusivity Sedgwick shares with many other queer theorists—ex-
plains much of Sedgwick’s frustration with an “inexhaustible”62  Foucauldian promise that 
never quite delivers.  The disappointment is instructive not only for what it reveals about 
the shifting complexities of Sedgwick’s Foucauldian obsession, but also for what it can tell 
us more generally about the felt experience of knowing Foucault.  So let me follow queer 
theory—like a fly to honey, like an addict to her drug—to the obsessive object: Sexuality 
One.   
 
2. A Slippery Obsession 
Literary analysis offers us a technical term for naming the Foucauldian trap whose ironies 
ensnare us: free indirect discourse.  This section’s focus on this rhetorical structure in Sex-
uality One goes a long way toward explaining what Sedgwick describes as “(mis?)under-
standings”63 of Foucault’s discussion of the repressive hypothesis.  The uncertainty con-
veyed by Sedgwick’s awkward parenthesis—”(mis?)understandings”—alerts us to the 
difficulties of untangling repression in Foucauldian queer theory.  Did Foucault dupe him-
self or only his readers? A technical discussion of free indirect discourse can help us to 
better grasp, in rhetorical terms, the irresolvable ambiguities involved in Foucault’s critique 
of the repressive hypothesis. 
As Marguerite Lips explains in her classic 1926 study of the form, free indirect 
discourse is linked to direct and indirect discourse, “the two procedures for reproducing 
inner states (perception, volition, feeling, knowledge), or manifestations of inner states 
(speech)”64 within the frame of an enunciating proposition.  Lips explains that free indirect 
discourse is an intermediary form of utterance that is neither direct—”She said, ‘I love 
you’”—nor explicitly indirect—”She said she loved her.”65  In explicit indirect discourse, the 
indirect nature of the reported speech is made clear by a framing enunciation such as the 
                                                 
62 Sedgwick, TF, 2. 
63 Sedgwick, TF, 11. 
64 Marguerite Lips, Le Style indirect libre (Paris: Payot, 1926), 7. (Translation mine).  Lips was influenced by 
the analyses of free indirect discourse begun by her teacher, Charles Bally, a student of the Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure.  One of the many valuable contributions of Lips's study is her careful tracing of 
the emergence of free indirect discourse as an object of linguistic analysis at the turn of the 20th century. 
See especially Charles Bally, “Le Style indirect libre en français moderne,” Germanisch-Romanische Monats-
schrift, vol. 4 (1912), 549–556. 
65 For the sake of simplicity, I use examples in English here. Lips's analysis mostly focuses on French 
examples whose verbal transpositions in particular differ from free indirect discourse in English.  In the 
case of the English translation of Foucault, I draw attention to those grammatical differences where they 
are relevant.  




“she said” of my example.66  Further, the shift from direct to indirect discourse is gramma-
tically marked by pronominal and verbal transpositions.  Thus, in the sentence—”She said 
she loved her”—the direct utterance “I love you” is grammatically transposed from a 
present to past verb and a first-person to third-person pronoun.   
So what is free indirect discourse? Free indirect discourse does two things: first, it 
deprives the indirect utterance of the enunciating frame that would make its indirection 
clear (“she said”) but, second, it retains some grammatical trace of the pronominal and ver-
bal transpositions that mark the discourse as indirect.67  Thus “she said, ‘I love you’” (direct 
discourse) becomes “she loved her” (free indirect discourse), where the enunciating frame 
of indirect discourse (“she said” in “she said she loved her”) is removed.   Importantly, free 
indirect discourse’s double-voiced irony stems from its explicit orientation within a nar-
rative frame.  As Monika Fludernik puts it: it “boils down to a contradiction between one’s 
reading of expressive features on the linguistic plane of the reported discourse and the 
larger discourse context that puts into doubt the verity or persuasiveness of the reported 
discourse.”68  The elimination of the framing enunciation makes the subjective intentiona-
lity or “inner state”69 of the utterance ambiguous and thereby destabilizes the utterance’s 
meaning.  In literary terms, free indirect discourse exposes the “intentional fallacy.”70  In 
philosophical terms, it knocks the cogito off its pedestal as the first principle from which all 
other truths can be deduced.71  Unlike the cogito’s propositions, free indirect discourse’s 
headless utterances are riven with doubt. 
In Sexuality One, Foucault exploits the radical doubt of free indirect discourse not 
only to destabilize the philosophical subject and its claims to truth, but also harnesses it for 
its rhetorical capacity to produce in the reader a felt experience of cognitive and ethical dis-
orientation.  Although the complex question of Foucault’s relation to rhetoric as a field is 
beyond the scope of this essay, it is worth pointing out that Foucault’s use of free indirect 
discourse demonstrates an aspect of his writing that has not been acknowledged by his 
rhetorical readers.  Most theorists of rhetoric have argued that Foucault’s use of rhetoric is 
primarily tropological.  Dave Tell’s assertion is typical: “we know that Foucault understood 
                                                 
66 Sometimes the framing enunciation is implicit.  See Lips, Chapter Three, “Le Style indirect,” 24-49. 
67 The precise criteria for determining which utterances qualify as free indirect discourse have been the 
subject of heated debate among linguists.  For an overview of these debates see Fludernik.  My definition 
of free indirect discourse paraphrases Fludernik's more technical definition of the two “minimal syntactic 
conditions” (95) that must be in place for free indirect discourse to be operative. 
68 Fludernik, 105-106. 
69 Lips, 7. 
70 For the classic New Critical argument against the notion of an authorial design or plan behind the text 
see William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the 
Meaning of Poetry (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954), 3-18. 
71 As Descartes puts it in the Preface to his Principles of Philosophy: “Thus I considered that someone who 
wishes to doubt everything cannot, for all that, doubt that he exists while he is doubting. ...Accordingly I 
took the being or existence of this thought as my first principle, and from it deduced very clearly the 
following principles.”  See René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in John Cottingham et. al. (eds. and 
trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
184. 
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rhetoric in terms of tropes.”72  But free indirect discourse is a rhetorical effect whose tropo-
logical force is achieved primarily through shifts in grammar.73  In the case of Sexuality One, 
the tropological power of repression, metaphorically figured as darkness blotting out the 
light, is both heightened and undone through the grammatical alterations of free indirect 
discourse.  That shifting relation between trope and grammar produces a rhetorical expe-
rience whose reverberations present knowledge in Foucault as a play of shadows.   
Free indirect discourse cannot be perceived outside of the specific discursive con-
texts in which it occurs: indeed, its force is a function of its context.  Along these lines, the 
context for Sexuality One’s free indirect utterances is a series of nested narrative frames in a 
mise en abyme structure of reported speech acts that destabilize the narrative voice and un-
moor the reader.74  This structure not only demonstrates the rhetorical complexity of Fou-
cault’s writing, but also offers an explanation for the cognitive disorientation that attends 
any reading of Sexuality One in relation to questions about the truth of sexuality.  What is 
the truth of our sex?  Are we repressed or liberated? hegemonic or subversive?  Status quo 
perpetuators or disruptors? Normative or queer? 
As Sedgwick points out, these questions have become tedious.  And yet, the more 
we read Foucault, the more he pulls us into the self-mirroring trap of these yes-or-no ques-
tions about the truth of sex, despite his admonition that the question we need to ask is 
precisely the question of the enunciating frame that free indirect discourse calls into ques-
tion.  The warning is clear.  As Foucault puts it, the question is not “why are we repres-
sed”75 (or liberated), normative (or queer), but rather: “why do we say, with so much 
passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and 
against ourselves, that we are repressed”76 (or liberated), normative or queer?  And yet des-
pite the clear warning, we all (myself included!) end up falling into the trap of making truth 
claims about Foucault’s theory of sexuality that bracket off the theory’s rhetorical framing. 
In these terms, Foucault’s clear question—”why do we say […] that we are repres-
sed?”—can be reexamined as a question about rhetoric and, specifically, about free indirect 
discourse: about killing the subject by lopping off its head, where its head is the framing 
enunciation (“she said”).  Further, although Foucault repeatedly reminds his readers about 
the importance of the narrative, writerly, constructed dimension of his work—that he has 
                                                 
72 Tell, 96.  Tell references page 84 of Foucault's The Order of Things to support this claim.  However, the 
supporting passage he references is a description of rhetoric in the Classical Age.  In referencing the 
passage as evidence of Foucault's understanding of rhetoric, Tell collapses the epistemic distinctions that 
structure Foucault's archeology of the human sciences.  For a similar view of Foucault as a thinker of 
tropes see Martha Cooper, “Rhetorical Criticism and Foucault's Philosophy of Discursive Events,” Central 
States Speech Journal, vol. 39, no. 1 (1988), 1-7. 
73 For an influential articulation of the interdependent relation between the tropological and grammatical 
functions of language, see Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” in Allegories of Reading: Figural Lan-
guage in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 3-19.  For De 
Man's conception of irony as nontropological see “The Concept of Irony” in Aesthetic Ideology.  Also see 
De Man's “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 187-228. 
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see Lucien Dällenbach, The Mirror in the Text (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
75 Foucault, HS1, 8. 
76 Ibid., 8-9. (Emphasis added). 




only ever written fictions, that his histoires are more story than history—we have not fully 
absorbed the rhetorical implications of his assertion about the enunciating frame (“she 
said”).  We have also missed how the framelessness of everyday discourse—the constant re-
moval of enunciating frames as we, other Victorians, move about in a repressive (and libe-
rated) world—produces the same experience of disorientation we feel in the more formal 
fictional world of Sexuality One.77  
What can be said, more specifically, about Foucault’s use of free indirect discourse in 
a story about modern sexuality as a felt experience of cognitive and moral disorientation? 
Let me situate this question within the specifically French literary context out of which Fou-
cault was writing.  As is well known even outside the francophone world, Gustave Flaubert 
offers the canonical example of the strategic use of free indirect discourse in French for 
producing, through irony, psychological disorientation and moral ambiguity.  As any text-
book in French literary history will tell us, Flaubert used the form so successfully that he 
was brought to trial for it;78 the dubious moral and epistemological status of free indirect 
discourse was made spectacularly clear when the prosecutor at Flaubert’s trial, Pinard, 
blamed Madame Bovary’s obscenity on a morally transgressive content that was a result of 
its style.  That style was not obscene in the pornographic sense—we find none of Sade’s sa-
lacious vocabulary or titillating plot-line in Flaubert’s story about an adulterous house-
wife—but rather because of the even more obscene beheading of the subject through the 
evacuation of the narrative anchor, “she said.”  The quote Pinard chose from Flaubert’s 
novel to support his point is, like my own examples, a passage about love:  
   
She said to herself again and again: “I have a lover! A lover!” reveling in the thought as 
though she had come into a second puberty.  At last she would possess those joys of love, 
that fever of happiness of which she had despaired.  She was entering something marve-
lous in which all was passion, ecstasy, delirium.79 
 
The effect of the shift from the first to the second and third sentences—from indirect dis-
course to free indirect discourse—is dramatic and unmistakable.  Hardly a literary critic, 
                                                 
77 My contention here, that free indirect discourse is a linguistic form that captures the lived disorien-
tation of our everyday world, may appear to contradict the assertion of Lips and others that complex 
forms of free indirect discourse pertain only to “written language.” (Lips, 83, translation mine)  But Lips 
herself begins to undo the written/spoken language opposition that Jacques Derrida in particular will 
famously dismantle forty years later in Of Grammatology (1967). “Indirect discourse,” Lips writes, “de-
rives from literary language's increasing tendency to merge with the procedures of spoken language” (83, 
translation mine). 
78 This is not to imply that Flaubert's rhetorical style was literally put on trial. As Dominick LaCapra 
explains in Madame Bovary on Trial (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982): “the trial of course did not 
investigate the problem of the so-called free indirect style.  And Flaubert himself does not use the term 
style indirect libre.” (127)  The trial revolved around a perception of the novel's moral transgressions which 
are a result of a rhetorical style that was not acknowledged as such. 
79 Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, translated by Lydia Davis (New York: Viking, 2010), 143.  For French 
original see Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary (Paris: Flammarion, 1986), 229.  Analyses of this passage 
and the trial are abundant.  See especially Hans Robert Jauss, “Literary History as Challenge to Literary 
Theory,” New Literary History vol. 2, no. 1 (1970), 7-37, and Dominick LaCapra, Madame Bovary on Trial, 
56-59.  Also see Elisabeth Ladenson, Dirt for Art's Sake: Books on Trial from “Madame Bovary” to “Lolita” 
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even Pinard realized that the subjective ground from which Emma’s thoughts are reported 
in sentence one crumbles completely by the third sentence.  The oft-noted effect of this un-
grounding is not only the diegetic confusion of which Pinard complained (whose thoughts 
are these? the narrator’s, the author’s, or the character’s?) but also, more important, an 
irresolvable split within the thoughts the reader is forced to inhabit: we both anticipate, 
with Emma, “those joys of love,” “that fever of happiness,” and the “passion, ecstasy, deli-
rium” of  “something marvelous” and, at the same time, disavow such fantasies as nothing 
more than the illusions of a bourgeois condition from which we want to distance ourselves.  
We simultaneously disidentify with Emma’s mind and are forced, by the narrative’s ironic 
grammar, to know with Emma “that fever of happiness”: to inhabit her ridiculous love.  In 
that self-contradictory positioning, the reader simultaneously adopts and repudiates a men-
tal state as powerfully present as it is unlocateable.  Entering a discourse that eliminates any 
narrative subject position to ground it, the reader’s subjectivity is temporarily undone.  
Rendered powerless to correct Emma’s delirious thoughts with moral truths of our own, we 
are left falling into a bottomless uncertainty: both in the “something marvelous” of Emma’s 
mind and, at the same time, plunged into a Goya-esque night without stars.    
The same thing happens to Foucault’s readers when we enter the “mind” of the 
repressive hypothesis.  Here, in French and English is Sexuality One’s opening sentence: 
 
Longtemps nous aurions supporté, et nous subirions aujourd’hui encore, un régime victorien.80 
[For a long time, the story goes, we supported a Victorian regime, and we continue to be 
dominated by it even today.81] 
 
To a French ear, the first verb in the past conditional makes this a very strange opening 
sentence.  The strangeness can be explained in rhetorical terms, through specific linguistic 
and literary features that frame Sexuality One as reported speech.  To begin, the book’s first 
word, longtemps, will immediately resonate for any bourgeois French reader with the most 
famous first word of the French literary canon, Proust’s “Longtemps, je me suis couché de 
bonne heure”82 in the opening line of A la recherche du temps perdu.  Foucault’s mimicry of the 
modern French exemplar of psychological interiority includes more than Sexuality One’s 
first word; in the subsequent phrase, Foucault both repeats and displaces the Proustian 
temporal incongruity of longtemps followed by a verb in the composite past form that gram-
matically signals a completed action.  In Proust’s case, the oddness of the completed action 
of the passé composé (“je me suis couché” [I went to bed]), where the reader expects the 
indefinite temporality of the imparfait, is what makes the opening longtemps so famous.   
Foucault repeats-with-a-difference that temporal incongruity through the use of free 
indirect discourse.  He does so specifically by transforming the Proustian first person sin-
gular passé composé into a verb in the first person plural past conditional (nous aurions 
supporté) whose strangeness marks the opening sentence as free indirect discourse.  If Fou-
cault were simply repeating Proust, the sentence would read: Longtemps nous avons supporté 
(For a long time we tolerated).  The verbal transposition from the Proustian passé composé 
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into the past conditional can only be explained as an effect of free indirect discourse.  The 
Proustian subject has been beheaded: Foucault has removed the enunciating frame that 
would stabilize the sentence as an utterance by someone in the past and thereby explain the 
past conditional as reported speech.  To be grammatically correct as indirect discourse, such 
a sentence would read something like: On disait que longtemps nous aurions supporté (It was 
said that for a long time we tolerated).83  That complex, implicit transposition of indirect 
discourse into free indirect discourse in the very first sentence of Sexuality One is rendered 
in the published English translation as “the story goes” (followed by the somewhat im-
perfect translation of the faux ami, “supporté,” as “supported” rather than the more accurate 
“tolerated” or “endured”).  To be sure, the verbal transposition that marks the sentence as 
free indirect discourse is somewhat lost in translation: “the story goes” doesn’t quite cap-
ture the strangeness or cognitive disorientation of the French original.  But translation prob-
lems notwithstanding, the opening sentence clearly tags this history of sexuality as reported 
speech about an inner state whose veracity, even as a Proustian fiction, is dubious at best.    
In the text’s third sentence, the suspected source of the reported discourse—the 
impersonal, third-person voice of the “on”—reveals itself:  
 
Au début du XVIIe siècle encore, une certaine franchise avait cours, dit-on.84 [At the beginning 
of the seventeenth century a certain frankness was still common, it would seem.85] 
 
The French “dit-on” (“it is said” or “one says”) pronominally confirms the first sentence’s 
status as free indirect discourse (where the implicit on disait que—dit-on in the past—has 
been removed).  The dit-on also relays the relentless epistemic and moral power of French 
universalism: the dit-on is the rule-bound, normative voice that collapses the past of on disait 
into the eternal truth of the present.  The dit-on is the truth of what-everyone-knows.  
(Again, the English translation of “it is said” into “it would seem” fails to render these subt-
leties.)  Most important, the third sentence of Sexuality One exposes the source of the first 
sentence’s fictional truth as the veridiction of universal consensus.   
This careful staging of the history of sexuality as a psychological fiction that comes 
to be taken as universal truth frames the subsequent grammatical and tropological shifts 
that will further destabilize any truth claims the reader might understand Foucault to be 
making over the course of the rest of the book.  As Paul de Man points out, referring to 
Quintilian’s theory of rhetoric, irony is “capable of coloring an entire discourse” or even 
“an entire life.”86  Such would be irony’s claims on Sexuality One were it not for the fact that 
the reader is repeatedly led to forget them.  Thus in the fourth sentence, the narrative frame 
of the dit-on disappears, and the reader falls into a historical world whose fabular status as a 
reported and therefore ironic discourse dissolves under the force of the dit-on’s truth.  This 
                                                 
83 As Lips explains, in French the verbal transpositions that follow the enunciating proposition (on dit que) 
of indirect discourse do not signify actual temporal shifts in the subordinated phrase but simply express 
the rule-bound subordination of the reported utterance to the enunciation through the verbal concor-
dances of basic grammar (25).  Because the English rules of concordance are different, the subordinated 
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84 Foucault, VS, 9. 
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Foucault Studies, No. 14, pp. 20-40. 
36 
 
fabular, earlier time is a time even before the once-upon-a-time temporality of longtemps 
when “sexual practices had little need of secrecy”: it is, like Emma’s fantasy love, a marve-
lous “time of direct gestures, shameless discourse, and open transgressions.”87  But in the 
play between the conditionality of the Proustian first sentence in free indirect discourse and 
the universalizing anchoring of the dit-on, the stability of the reader’s conception of time 
and historical truth is radically undermined.  This disorientation is an effect of grammar: 
the verbal shifts and enunciating frames which, as we’ve seen, structure the utterances of 
the first two paragraphs. 
These grammatical effects of disorientation are then tropologically sublated and given 
form as an image: as the half-light/half-dark figure of twilight.  This moment of tropological 
sublation on the opening page marks the entry of repression into Foucault’s story about sex: 
repression is the shadowy twilight: 
 
A ce plein jour, un rapide crépuscule aurait fait suite, jusqu’aux nuits monotones de la 
bourgeoisie victorienne.  La sexualité est alors soigneusement renfermée.  Elle emménage.  ...Le 
couple, légitime et procréateur, fait la loi.88 [But twilight soon fell upon this bright day, 
followed by the monotonous nights of the Victorian bourgeoisie.  Sexuality was carefully 
confined.  It moved into the home...  The legitimate and procreative couple laid down the 
law.89]  
 
The image of twilight gives figural form to a discursive shift the reader experiences as a fall.  
Such falling, as De Man explains, is “ultimately ironical.”90  The sublation of truth as a 
“bright day” immediately tumbles us back into the shadowy twilight that will end in the 
monotonous nights of bourgeois bedrooms: the same bottomless void of Flaubert’s fictional 
world, the same, “most monotonous” of Goya-esque “nights” that “no star lights up.”91   
Specifically, the shift from the fictional realm of the book’s first sentence to the realm of 
universally accepted veridiction in the second paragraph is compressed, here in the third 
“twilight” paragraph, in the fall from the paragraph’s first sentence in free indirect dis-
course to a historical present tense framed by a repressive twilight.92  But like the first 
sentence, repression falls in a past conditional (aurait fait suite) that marks the utterance as 
free indirect discourse: this twilit truth is riven with doubt.  The grammatical shift from the 
past conditional is missed in the English translation, where the dubious veracity of a figural 
twilight is rendered in the simple past as “twilight soon fell,” and where the abrupt plunge 
from the doubt-ridden, twilit realm of free indirect discourse into the historical present (“la 
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sexualité est,” “elle emménage,” “le couple, légitime et producteur, fait la loi”) is lost altogether 
with the English preterite verbs (“sexuality was carefully confined; it moved into the home 
...the legitimate and procreative couple laid down the law.”) 
The crucial point here is that the French sentences in the present quoted above are 
framed by the free indirect discourse of the twilight sentence.  This free indirect discursive 
frame exposes the slipperiness of the present-tense sentences as propositional statements (la 
sexualité est [sexuality is]).  Although they appear as grammatical forms that express indica-
tive truth, the present they convey is radically destabilized by time’s contingency, a frac-
turing temporality we habitually stabilize as a history that finds its completion in the now, 
in us.   Although grammatically these sentences appear to speak the truth of history, they 
are unmoored by a free indirect discourse that makes them float, like Goya’s witches, as 
verbal “forms born of nothing.”93  The present tense deployed here is, indeed, the historical 
present, but it is the ruptured historical present of a Foucauldian genealogy.  The reader 
falls, with twilight, into the cracks of that present, plunging simultaneously into an illusory 
stability we want to imagine (tropologically, like Emma) as true, but whose temporal insta-
bility we feel (grammatically) as a radical disorientation that unmoors us.  When we read 
these sentences we experience, simultaneously, the certainty of truth and the nagging sense 
of a massive deception.  Isn’t it true that “sexuality is confined,” that “it is dominated by the 
figure of the procreative couple?”  Isn’t it true, as queer theorists might put it, that sexuality 
is heteronormative?  What they say is true ...isn’t it? 
 
3. Ridiculous Love 
Despite our not clear and distinct feeling about heteronormativity when we read Foucault, 
we remain Cartesian in our stubborn faith in a God—our sexuality—who guarantees the 
cogito’s certainty.  That certainty gives us back ourselves through a tautological circle Fou-
cault defines in The Order of Things as the transcendental-empirical doublet of modern 
knowledge.  The dualistic logic of that subject-object circle gauges our freedom, per the re-
pressive hypothesis, in accordance with our capacity to resist the very self-objectification 
that allows us to know ourselves as subjects.  At the same time, over the course of Sexuality 
One, we are led into a different, more insidious logic: the biopolitical ontology of gradation.  
But in our repressive habits we both acknowledge and forget the gradual, overlapping shift 
Foucault describes from opposition to gradation.  From the disciplinary nights of the Vic-
torian bourgeoisie we have been freed, it would seem, into the televised titillation of Girls 
Gone Wild, even as we are being constituted as the results of an equation that transposes 
such titillation into mathematical measures on a normal curve.  And even knowing this—
understanding normalization and biopower’s statistical reordering of sexuality as life it-
self—it is nearly impossible not to find ourselves, when acting politically, acting opposi-
tionally in accordance with a repressive logic: “we are conscious of defying established 
power, our tone of voice shows that we know we are being subversive, and we ardently 
conjure away the present and appeal to the future, whose day will be hastened by the con-
tribution we believe we are making.  Something...  smacks of revolt, of promised freedom, 
of the coming age of a different law.”94  This is powerful stuff—it is queer politics as we 
                                                 
93 Foucault, History of Madness, 531. 
94 Foucault, HS1, 6-7. 
Foucault Studies, No. 14, pp. 20-40. 
38 
 
know it—and no sexual activist, myself included, can simply bypass this repressive struc-
ture. 
But what would it feel like to think sexuality differently than this?  Let me bring 
these reflections to a provisional conclusion by bringing Foucault and Sedgwick together 
again.  I opened by suggesting that Foucault’s shadow confession about his own sexuality 
is not a confession at all, but rather a problematization of the dark/light dualism of Western 
thought.  I also argued that free indirect discourse offers a rhetorical lens onto the how of 
non-dualism in Sexuality One, where the radical disorientation of Foucault’s headless sen-
tences exposes the illusory stabilities of the present, the subject, and repressive sexuality.  
Finally, I suggested that the figure of shadow gives tropological form to the felt experience 
of cognitive and moral disorientation that free indirect discourse both produces and ex-
plains.   
But it is here that Sedgwick’s Kleinian worries about the “Foucauldian paranoid”95 
nag at the neatness of my rhetorical exposures.  As long ago as 1986, in The Coherence of 
Gothic Conventions (before Epistemology of the Closet and the birth of queer theory), Sedgwick 
wrote: “The problem here is not simply that paranoia is a form of love, for—in a certain 
language—what is not?  The problem is rather that, of all forms of love, paranoia is the 
most ascetic, the love that demands least from its object.”96  In this self-citational mise en abyme 
of her doubts about paranoid reading, Sedgwick implicitly produces Foucault as the ascetic 
version of her own more greedy, even “ridiculous love.”97  For all his “gorgeous narrative 
work” and “drop-dead-elegant”98 conceptual transformations, Foucault exemplifies for 
Sedgwick the “paranoid subject’s proffer of himself and his cognitive talent”99 in a demand 
on the reader that is a kind of love, but a “love that demands least from its object.”100 
This vision of a paranoid Foucault whose love offerings are meager is a common one 
(although usually not expressed in a prose as exquisite as Sedgwick’s); it is a vision of 
Foucault that Sedgwick aligns specifically with his early work: the paranoid project of 
“unveiling hidden violence,” she writes, “would seem to depend on a cultural context, like the 
one assumed in Foucault’s early works, in which violence would be deprecated and hence 
hidden in the first place.”101  Sedgwick also seems to imply, without developing her 
thought, that some other-than-paranoid possibilities emerge in Foucault’s later writings.  
She specifically aligns the “ethical possibility”102 inherent in Kleinian reparative strategies 
“with the subject’s movement toward what Foucault calls ‘care of the self,’ the often very 
fragile concern to provide the self with pleasure and nourishment in an environment that is 
perceived as not particularly offering them.”103 
                                                 
95 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (New York: Methuen, 1986), xi; cited in 
Sedgwick, TF, 132. 
96 Ibid., 132. 
97 Sedgwick, TF, vii (dedication page). 
98 Ibid., 132. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 140. 
102 Ibid., 137. 
103 Ibid. 




In a sense, then, in Touching Feeling Foucault and Sedgwick come together again in 
an inverted mise en abyme of an ascetic love Sedgwick located in Foucault long ago.  In true 
Foucauldian (or is it Sedgwickian?) fashion, the beautiful symmetry of Foucault’s early as-
cetic love as the inverted double of Sedgwick’s later ridiculous love stands as an emblem of 
the relation between them.  The antagonistic dualisms of the mise en abyme—Foucault ver-
sus Sedgwick, paranoid versus reparative—begin to collapse in on themselves, as lovers 
who have been fighting often do: Foucault with Sedgwick, paranoid with reparative, ascetic 
with ridiculous love.   
The how of that nondualism belongs as much to Foucault as it does to Sedgwick.  I 
have tried to show this in the rhetorical textures of Foucault’s shadow play, with a specific 
focus on a free indirect discourse that unmoors the reader and dissolves the subject.  To in-
voke the language of a later Foucault who was always allowing himself to be undone, even 
and especially in the mad beginning of his work, free indirect discourse creates a self-
releasing grammar with ethical possibility: a desubjectivating, rhetorical practice that “en-
ables one to get free of oneself”104 and to “free thought from what it silently thinks, and so 
enable it to think differently.”105  
If this self-undoing dissolution is the form of love Foucault offers to his reader, it is 
not only an ascetic love that demands little from its object.  From History of Madness to his 
final work, Foucault’s paranoid exposures are impelled by a love whose rhetorical, con-
ceptual, and ethical demand on its reader can be excessive and, at times, overwhelming.  It 
is a “ridiculous love” whose reparative textures are better expressed in the “touchy-feely” 
language of felt experience than they are in any language of science.  Foucault obliges us, in 
his demand on us, “to take part in a process of recognition and reparation”106 without any 
final sublation of ourselves into a tidy Hegelian self-recognition.  Instead, Foucault’s “oeuv-
re plunges [us] into a void [that] is the space of our work...  [in] our confused vocation as 
apostles and interpreters.”107 It is “the historian [who] belongs to the family of ascetics,”108 
but Foucault is not simply a historian.  He is also a poet-philosopher who, like Nietzsche 
before him, practices an archival, rhetorical, self-undoing art he calls genealogy. 
That Nietzschean word—genealogy, with all its post-moral ethical resonance—
returns me to the place I started: an unpublished, archival trace of Foucault that has tugged 
at me for years, ever since I came across it, in 2006, in the Foucault archives in Normandy.  
“I felt excluded,” the trace says, “not so much rejected, but belonging to society’s sha-
dow.”109  In the end, it matters little to whom that voice belongs.  “What difference does it 
make who is speaking?”110  The famous Foucault of that trace could just as easily be one of 
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those “infamous men”111 encountered by a not-yet-famous Foucault in the archives of mad-
ness in the late 1950s.  What matters more than the name of that voice is its queer solidarity 
with a shadowed world which, in modernity, is given the face of deviant sexuality.  The 
reparative, ethical promise of that queer solidarity has not been exhausted, and will surely 
outlive its figuration as sex. 
Eros is a word I borrow from Sappho to name that outliving.  Outliving is our con-
tinually renewed encounter with the concrete traces of queer modes of belonging that ex-
ceed both the oppositional logic of repression-liberation and the continuous ontology of 
biopolitical gradation.  The demand those queer traces make on us is necessarily excessive 
because outliving, by definition, exceeds us: it produces a difficult, erotic love that is as 
much a practice as a way of knowing.  Foucault, like Sedgwick, demands of us a ridiculous 
love.  It is a love we might experience, after Foucault and Sedgwick, in the reparative mode 
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